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There is no dispute that Congress may permissibly extend its
regulatory authority beyond United States borders.' In considering a statute's transnational operation, the United States
Supreme Court has traditionally presumed that the statute will
apply only to actions occurring within the United States absent a
contrary congressional intent.' Thus, the analysis of the statute's
extraterritoriality invokes a careful evaluation of legislative intent.' Recently, considerable debate has surrounded the transnational application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), 4 which prohibits an employer from discriminating
against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, gender or
national origin. 5 In deciding whether Title VII applied extraterritorially and restricted the conduct of United States employers toward their American workers abroad, the Court determined
I See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952). The Steele
Court stated that when Congress "prescrib[es] standards of conduct for American
citizens [it) may project the impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of
the United States." Id. See also Simon & Brown, InternationalEnforcement of Title VII
A Small World After All?, 16 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 281, 283 (1990-1991) ("courts generally concede that Congress does in fact possess sufficient authority to extend the
jurisdictional reach of Title VII to American employees of U.S. companies abroad.
The disputed question is whether Congress ever intended to exercise that
authority").
2 See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). The Foley Brothers
Court declared that the unexpressed intent of Congress regarding a statute's extraterritorial application may be discerned through the canon of construction which
restricts the statute's operation to the territorial boundaries of the United States
absent an expressed transnational intent. Id. (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 437 (1932)).
3 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (application of the
Act ofJuly 3, 1926 in foreign countries involves an analysis of statutory construction, not congressional power); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98
(1922) (transnational operation of the United States Criminal Code depends on
Congress's purpose as evidenced by statutory language and the nature of the described crimes).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
5 Id. at § 2000e-2. Title VII provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
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whether the statute's alleged expression of transnational intent
the presumption against
to overcome
was sufficient
extraterritoriality. 6
The Court has employed two approaches in ascertaining the
extraterritorial intent of Congress. 7 Where the statute's application in a foreign country would disrupt international comity, the
Court has demanded a clear, explicit expression of transnational
intent. Absent such interference, however, the Court has relied
on a variety of sources to discern congressional intent. 9 Confronted with a claim that Title VII operated in foreign countries,
the Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company
(ARAMCO),' ° recently required a clear expression of transnational intent to defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality,
regardless of the implications for international comity."
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.

6 See Turley, "When in Rome "."MultinationalMisconduct and the PresumptionAgainst
Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U.L. REV. 598, 599 (1990) (the general refusal of United
States courts to apply employment statutes abroad stems from "an often used, but
poorly understood, tool of judicial construction: the presumption against
extraterritoriality").
7 Compare Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)
(presumption against extraterritoriality requires Congress to express affirmatively
its transnational intent if a statute's extraterritorial operation would interfere with
international relations) and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (a clear, express statement of extraterritorial intent is necessary to rebut the presumption where a statute, if applied abroad, would
displace the domestic law of a foreign nation) with Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (presumption against extraterritoriality is a means by which
courts may assess the unexpressed intent of Congress regarding the transnational
application of a statute).
8 See Benz, 353 U.S. at 147 (due to the unavoidable international discord which
would result from the operation of the Labor Management Relations Act in foreign
countries, the presumption against extraterritoriality required a clear expression of
transnational intent); McCulloch, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (in light of the disruption of international comity caused by the transnational application of the National
Labor Relations Act, the statute's lack of a clear statement of extraterritoriality
failed to overcome the presumption).
9 See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285 (examination of the Eight Hour Law's language, legislative history and administrative interpretations failed to reveal evidence of Congress' unexpressed transnational intent).
10 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
11 Id. at 1230 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138,
147 (1957); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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In 1979, Ali Boureslan, a naturalized American citizen, began his employment with Aramco Services Company (ASC) at its
principal offices in Houston, Texas.' 2 The following year,
Boureslan received a transfer from ASC to its parent company,
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), at its principal place
of business in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 1 3 Both ASC and Aramco
were Delaware corporations licensed to do business in Texas. 4
In 1982, Boureslan's Aramco supervisor in Saudi Arabia allegedly directed repeated racial, religious and ethnic slurs at
Boureslan.' 5 Boureslan was discharged two years later.' 6
Upon his dismissal, Boureslan filed a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).' 7
Boureslan then brought suit against Aramco and ASC in the
12 Id. at 1229-30. Boureslan, born in Lebanon, worked as an engineer for
Aramco. Id. at 1230.
13 Id. at 1230. Aramco conducted its operations, including the exploration, production and refining of oil and gas, entirely within Saudi Arabia. Boureslan v.
Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 1988). Thus, Boureslan's transfer from the
subsidiary to its parent company necessitated a transfer from the United States to
Saudi Arabia. Id.
14 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
15 Id. See generally Comment, United States CorporationsOperatingin Saudi Arabia and
Laws Affecting Discriminationin Employment: Which Law Shall Prevail?, 8 Loy. L.A. Irr'L
& COMP. L.J. 135, 144 (1985) (American corporations doing business in Saudi Arabia are subject to Saudi regulations regarding the employment of women and nonMoslems).
16 Id.
17 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1230. Congress created the EEOC to administer Title
VII. Id. Section 2000e-4 provides in part:
(a) There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which shall be composed of five members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same political party. Members of the Commission shall be
appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate for a term of five years. ...
(g) The Commission shall have power(1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional,
State, local, and other agencies, both public and private, and individuals; ...
(4) upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees or
some of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose members or some
of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in effectuating the
provisions of this subchapter, to assist in such effectuation by conciliation or such other remedial action as is provided by this subchapter;

(6) to intervene in a civil action brought under section 2000e-5
of this title by an aggrieved party against a respondent other than a
government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982). See generally W. CONNOLLY & M. CONNOLLY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY § 4.01 at 4-2 (1990) (EEOC has
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United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
alleging that his termination constituted employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion and national origin in violation
of state law and Title VII.l ' The district court concluded that
Title VII did not apply abroad and granted the companies' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 9 The district court also dismissed Boureslan's state law claims for lack of
pendent jurisdiction. 2' The district court asserted that a clear intent to override the presumption against exterritoriality did not
exist because neither thestatute's language nor legislative history
indicated congressional intent to extend Title VII protections to
American citizens employed abroad by United States
corporations. 21
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.2 2 The Fifth Circuit panel granted the EEOC's motion to
authority "to issue regulations, to institute proceedings and to bring an action in
federal court to terminate discriminatory employment practices").
Under Title VII, an employment discrimination claim must:
(1) [B]e timely;
(2) [B]e filed by either an aggrieved person or someone filing on his
or her behalf, or a member of the Commission;
(3) [B]e filed against a party covered by Title VII: employers, unions,
apprenticeship training programs, or employment agencies;
(4) [Alllege a type of discrimination prohibited by Title VII: race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or retaliation;
(5) [Alllege an adverse employment action;
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LW 983-84 (1983).
These requirements give the EEOC considerable control in the maintenance of Title VII claims. See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 267-68 (1980) ("Congress prescribed an administrative obstacle course which must be run by every private plaintiff seeking to
sue under Title VII. It did this by placing the EEOC at the courthouse door and
requiring a person allegedly discriminated against to invoke the Commission's
processes by filing a charge with it prior to bringing suit").
18 Aramco, 111 S.Ct. at 1230.
19 Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629, 631 (S.D. Tex. 1987). The district
court announced that a presumption of territorial intent arose from the statutory
lack of an explicit statement of extraterritoriality. Id. at 630. The court also declined
to apply Title VII abroad as a matter of policy, stressing that the transnational execution of the statute would interfere with the sovereignty of foreign countries. Id. at
631. In view of the potential conflict between Title VII and Saudi labor laws, the
district court stated that "it should be Congress that mandates extraterritorial application." Id.
20 Id. (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)).
21 Id. at 630. The district court suggested that because the legislative history of
Title VII contained only minimal references to extraterritoriality, Congress most
likely did not intend to execute the statute in foreign countries. Id. The court emphasized that in the 1964 enactment of Title VII Congress was solely concerned
with domestic employment discrimination. Id.
22 Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988). In a 2-1 decision, the
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Fifth Circuit required a clear expression of intent on the part of Congress to apply
Title VII abroad to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 1019.
The court of appeals found nothing in the statute's language indicating the requisite intent. See Id. at 1018. The Fifth Circuit noted that although the alien exemption provision of Title VII precludes application of the statute to "an employer with
respect to employment of aliens outside of any state," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l, such
language does not support a negative inference that Congress intended Title VII to
regulate the employment relationship of United States employers and their American workers abroad. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018 (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973)). Similarly, the court did not find anything in Title VII's
legislative history warranting extraterritorial application. Additionally, the court
posited that the legislative history of a statute should be afforded a secondary level
of importance in ascertaining congressional intent to that of the statute's language.
Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1986)). Observing the
policy arguments against requiring a United States employer to abide by Title VII
in a foreign land with often contrary religious and social practices, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that neither Title VII's language nor its legislative history were sufficient
to overcome the "high hurdle" of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at
1020, 1021. See Turley, supra note 6, at 624 ("The Fifth Circuit essentially demanded an express statutory mandate for applying Title VII extraterritorially").
In a strong dissent, Judge King declared that contrary to the majority's assertion, an express, affirmative statement of congressional intent to apply a statute
abroad need not be shown in order to defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality. Bareslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (King, J., dissenting). Rather, the dissent maintained, only when a statute's extraterritorial application would violate international
law must there be an explicit expression of congressional intent to overcome the
presumption. Id. at 1023 (King, J., dissenting) (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S.
25, 32 (1982); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963)). Judge King explained that absent such a violation, a court
may use the "traditional methods of statutory interpretation" in examining a statute's language and legislative history for extraterritorial intent. Id. at 1024 (King, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent contended that applying Title VII extraterritorially would not implicate problems of international comity due to two aspects of the statute: (i) the
negative inference drawn from the alien exemption provision, such that Title VII
seeks only to regulate the actions of U.S. employers and citizens, and (ii) the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ clause, designed to decrease conflicts with
foreign laws, and provides an exception to the extraterritorial application of Title
VII where sex, religion, etc., constitutes an essential element of a given job. Id. at
1030 (King, J., dissenting). Consequently, applying a less strict standard for determining congressional intent,Judge King found evidence of extraterritorial intent in
the alien exemption provision and denounced the majority's reading of the alien
exemption provision as "meaningless" and "superfluous." Id. at 1032, 1033 (King,
J., dissenting). See Cherian, CurrentDevelopments in TransnationalEmployment Rights, 40
LAB. L.J. 259, 262 (1989) (panel majority failed to realize that because congressional statutes do not usually apply to aliens in foreign countries, Congress would
have had no reason to enact the alien exemption provision unless it intended to
protect American employees abroad); Gallozzi, Jurisdiction-Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Statute ProscribingEmployment Discrimination-CongressionalIntent, 83 AM. J.
OF INT'L L. 375, 380 (1989) (an unwarranted restriction of Title VII resulted from
the failure of the panel majority to consider jurisdictional principles involved in
international law); Comment, Boureslan v. Aramco: Equal Employment Opportunity for
U.S. Citizens Abroad, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 564, 588 (1989) (decision of the panel
majority creates an "ominous loophole" of transnational employment discrimina-
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intervene2 3 and, thereupon, the court granted the request of
Boureslan and the Commission for a rehearing. 24 The Fifth Circuit vacated the panel's decision, reheard the case en banc and
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Boureslan's complaint.2 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 26 and
agreed to address the unsettled state of Title VII's extraterritorial application.2 7 After analyzing the Title VII language, the
Court declared that Boureslan and the EEOC failed to produce
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption against extraterritotion through which United States corporations may engage in the very discriminatory practices that Title VII was intended to prohibit).
23 See Cherian, supra note 22, at 263. Cherian, a Commissioner of the EEOC,
asserted that the EEOC sought intervention because the panel decision constituted
a "serious threat to our Title VII jurisdiction to protect American workers abroad."
Id.
24 Boureslan v. Aramco, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988). One commentator has proposed that "Judge King's eloquent and well-reasoned dissent, coupled with the participation of the EEOC and numerous civil rights organizations in the amicus effort,
may have prompted the Fifth Circuit to reexamine this issue en banc." See Gallozzi,
supra note 17, at 380. But see Prentice, The Muddled State of Title VII's Application
Abroad, 41 LAB. L.J. 633, 639 (1990) ("Judge King's dissent was sufficiently persuasive to induce her Fifth Circuit colleagues to rehear the case, but not to change
their minds").
25 EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991). The en banc majority reiterated the panel majority's holding that Title VII failed to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality because the statute did not contain the requisite clear
statement of transnational intent. Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274. Again in dissent,
Judge King claimed that the alien exemption provision constituted the requisite
showing of transnational intent in that Congress would not have exempted aliens if
it did not intend to protect citizens extraterritorially under Title VII. Id. at 1275
(King, J., dissenting). The dissent also sounded an insightful warning concerning
the merely territorial operation of the statute, declaring that "[t]he salutary goals of
Title VII cannot be fully realized if the fortuitous location of an American employee
at the overseas office of an American firm could mean the difference between equal
opportunity and discrimination at will." Id. at 1282 (King, J., dissenting). See Simon
& Brown, supra note 1, at 283 ("the Boureslan majority's analysis differed from the
dissent and from previous case law in the weight the court accorded the presumption against extraterritorial application").
26 EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990). Both Boureslan and the EEOC filed
petitions for certiorari. Id.
27 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1230. Compare Bryant v. International Schools Servs.,
Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980) (Title VII operates extraterritorially to regulate the hiring procedures of an American corporation employing United States
citizens as teachers in Iran), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982) and
Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D.Md. 1986) (Title VII operates
extraterritorially regarding a United States corporation employing American citizens in Germany and compensating them with benefit packages) with Boureslan v.
Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988) (neither language nor legislative history of
Title VII warrant its application to United States corporation's dismissal of American worker in Saudi Arabia), afd on reh 'g, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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riality. 28 Accordingly, the Court held that Title VII does not apply transnationally to regulate the conduct of United States
employers toward their American employees abroad.2 9
To appreciate fully the multinational import of Aramco, it is
necessary to examine the foundation upon which the Supreme
Court based its decision.3 ° The nascent pronouncement regarding the extraterritoriality of congressional statutes was proffered
in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 3 1 In American Banana, an
Alabama corporation alleged that a New Jersey corporation violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 32 by monopolizing the Panamanian banana trade.3 3 Relying on the principle that " '[a]ll
28 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1236. The Court dismissed as ambiguous Title VII's
express application to employers engaged in commerce "between a State and any
place outside thereof." Id. at 1231 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1982)). Moreover, the Court determined that even though Title VII explicitly exempted coverage for aliens working abroad, such language did not clearly manifest a
congressional intention to protect American citizens employed in foreign countries.
Id. at 1233-34 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1982)).
29 Id. at 1229.
30 The turn-of-the-century strict rule against extraterritoriality gradually developed into a less exacting presumption. See Turley, supra note 5, at 602. This development is apparent in a series of United States Supreme Court decisions. See
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963) (creation of international discord by a statute's application in foreign countries requires the extraterritorial intent of Congress to be clearly expressed); Benz
v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (where the extraterritorial application of a statute would interfere with international relations, Congress
must produce an affirmative, clear expression of transnational intent for the statute
to operate abroad); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952)
(congressional intent to apply a statute abroad must appear for the statute to extend beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States); Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (language or legislative history of a statute must
disclose Congress's transnational intent in order for the statute to operate in foreign countries); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (unless an
extraterritorial intent appears, a statute will only apply within the United States);
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922) (a criminal statute may be
either territorially or extraterritorially construed depending on the nature of the
crime); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (any
doubt as to Congress's transnational intent mandates the solely territorial application of a statute).
31 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). Accord Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918)
(lack of specific language manifesting intent to regulate employment contracts between alien seamen and their foreign employers when the vessel enters American
waters precludes the application of the Seaman's Act of 1915). See Turley, supra
note 5, at 655 ("The Supreme Court initially required clear expressions of congressional intent because all extraterritorial claims were viewed as running afoul of international law").
32 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (originally codified at ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 210
(1890)).
33 American Banana, 213 U.S. at 354. The defendant, a United States corporation,
allegedly bought the operations of many of its competitors and acquired a control-
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legislation is prima facie territorial,' ",s4 the Court initially noted
that the law of the country where an act occurs generally determines the act's lawfulness. 3 5 Because no contrary intent was indicated, the American Banana Court explained that the statute
extended only as far as the legislature's territorial authority.3 6
Reflecting both the stringent American Banana view and an
emerging trend to relax that standard, the Court in United States
v. Bowman 3 7 promulgated a dichotomous framework to assess
congressional intent regarding the extraterritorial application of
criminal statutes.3 8 In Bowman, an American steamship took on
600 tons of oil while docked in Rio de Janeiro.3 9 American shipping line officials reported the number as 1000 tons and received
payment for the inflated figure.40 Charged with conspiracy, the
defendants claimed that the United States Criminal Code (Criminal Code) 4 ' did not apply because the alleged misconduct occurred on the high seas and in Brazil.4 2 The Bowman Court,
however, found that the Criminal Code did regulate such conling interest in others. Id. The defendant subsequently organized a selling company
in order to fix prices. Id. When the plaintiff began to build a banana plantation and
a railway in Panama, the defendant ordered the plaintiff to sell his interests or to
cease construction. Id. Upon the plaintiff's refusal to comply, the defendant allegedly prompted Costa Rican soldiers to seize the plaintiff's operations. Id.
34 Id. at 357 (citations omitted). For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
explained that "[t]he allegation of an act done in another sovereignty, to be a violation of our own, is simply alleging an impossibility, and all laws to punish such acts
are necessarily void." State v. Carter, 27 N.J. 499, 503 (1859).
35 American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356 (citing Slater v. Mexican National R.R. Co.,
194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904)). The American Banana Court also contended that seemingly unrestricted statutory language such as "[e]very person who shall monopolize" and "[e]very contract in restraint of trade" will apply only to persons "subject
to such legislation, not all [persons] that the legislator subsequently may be able to
catch." Id. at 357.
36 See id. at 356. See also Turley, supra note 6, at 604 (American Banana represented the "rigid view of extraterritorial jurisdiction" of the early twentieth century); Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multinational Enterprise, 73
GEO. L.J. 1465, 1477-78 (1985) ("For much of the nineteenth century, the Court
adhered to the principle of territoriality, the traditional and primary basis of
jurisdiction").
37 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
38 See id. at 97-99. The Court explained that the construction of a criminal statute relating to extraterritoriality depends on the nature of the crime and the territorial restriction on a government's authority to sanction certain conduct under
international law. Id. at 97-98.
39 Id. at 95.
40 Id. The Americans, joined by one British citizen, thereby defrauded the
United States government, a major stockholder in the shipping company. Id.
41 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1990) (originally codified at ch. 194, § 2, 40 Stat. 1015 (1918)).
42 Bowman, 260 U.S. at 96-97.
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duct.4" The Court stated that because crimes such as arson and
burglary logically occur within the legislators' territorial jurisdiction, there must exist a clear expression of transnational intent in
44
order to defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Conversely, the Bowman Court maintained, a criminal statute
sanctioning conduct which could reasonably be expected to occur beyond United States boundaries, such as fraud or obstruction, may overcome the presumption merely by the natural
inference that Congress intended the statute to apply
45
extraterritorially.
A decade later, the Court continued to move away from the
strict American Banana view of territoriality in Blackmer v. United
States.4 6 In Blackmer, an American citizen residing in Paris refused
to return to the United States and respond to subpoenas which
required him to appear as a witness at a criminal trial.4 7 The citizen was subsequently charged with contempt.48 In advancing an
extraterritorial scope for a congressional act,4 9 that defined the
subpoena power of United States courts, the Blackmer Court un43 Id. at 99. The Court proclaimed that due to the vast array of places in which
fraud upon the United States government could occur, including foreign countries
and the high seas, Congress must have intended the Criminal Code to apply transnationally. Id. at 102.
44 Id. at 98. The Court elaborated that the territorial nature of such crimes required a specific provision of extraterritoriality, in that the absence of an express
statement negated any transnational purpose that Congress may have held. Id.
45 Id. at 98. The Court de-emphasized Congress's failure to provide expressly
for the transnational operation of the Criminal Code. Id. Rather, the Court contended that the logical inference from the nature of the covered offense, fraud without regard to locality, was such that "Congress could not have meant to confine
[the statute] to the land of the United States." Id. at 99. See Note, The Extraterritorial
Effect of Federal Criminal Statutes: Offenses Directed at Members of Congress, 6 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 773, 780 (1983) (Bowman's reasonable inference of extraterritoriality constituted the Court's introduction of an "exception to the normally
strict rule of interpretation" which is applicable "when there [is] no indication as to
jurisdictional reach, but failing to allow extraterritorial effect would defeat the clear
purpose of the legislation").
Thus, Bowman marked the beginning of the end for the American Banana approach. See New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925). In Chisholm,
the Court enunciated a test for extraterritorial intent which focused on either the
statute's express language or the circumstances for evidence of such intent. Id. at
31 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)).
46 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
47 Id. at 433. The subpoenas required the defendant to appear before the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia as a witness for the United States. Id.
48 Id. Because of the citizen's failure to respond to both subpoenas, the trial
court fined the defendant $60,000 and ordered that his property be seized in order
to satisfy the penalties. Id.
49 Ch. 762, § 1, 44 STAT. 835 (1926) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 711
(1926).
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derscored the specific procedures by which the act provided for
service of process on American citizens in foreign countries.5"
Cautioning that the statute would accommodate merely a territorial scope unless a contrary intent exists, 5 ' the Court concluded
that the act's clear language supported the statute's application
to Americans residing abroad.52 Anticipating the importance of
international comity 53 as a factor in the extraterritoriality ru-

bric,54 the Court clarified that the mere service of process on an
American citizen residing abroad did not infringe upon the for55
eign nation's authority.
50 Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 433-36. The Act permitted a United States consul in the
country of the desired witness to effect personal service. Id. at 434-35 (citing Ch.
.762, § 2, 44 Stat. 835 (1926)). The statute provides:
Whenever the attendance at the trial of -any criminal action of a witness, being a citizen of the United States or domiciled therein, who is
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, is desired by the Attorney General or any assistant or district attorney acting under him, the
judge of the court before which such action is pending, or who is to sit
in the trial of the same, may, upon proper showing, order that a subpoena issue, addressed to any consul of the United States within any
country in which such witness may be, commanding such witness to
appear before the said court at a time and place therein designated.
Ch. 762, § 2, 44 Stat. 835 (1926) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 712 (1926)).
51 Blackner, 284 U.S. at 437 (citing Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619,
622 (1925); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922); American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)). The Blackmer Court stated that
"[w]hile the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the question of its application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are
concerned, is one of construction, not of legislative power." Id. (citations omitted).
The Court added that "[n]or can it be doubted that the United States possesses the
power inherent in sovereignty to require the return to this country of a citizen,
resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires it, and to penalize him in
case of refusal." Id.
52 Id. at 436. The Court reasoned that the defendant's American citizenship
mandated his compliance with any laws of the United States applicable to him overseas. Id. As a consequence, United States courts could permissibly sanction the defendant for his unlawful actions which took place on foreign soil. Id. (citing United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922)).
53 Id. at 439. Comity is defined as the general principle "that courts of one state
or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state orjurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect."
BLACK's LAW Dic'riONARv 242 (5th ed. 1979).
54 Blackner, 284 U.S. at 439. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19, 21-22 (1963) (language or legislative history of a
statute must contain a clear expression of extraterritorial intent where the statute
would initiate international discord if applied abroad); Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (Congress must express transnational intent in affirmative, clear manner if statute's extraterritorial application would disrupt international relations).
55 Id. at 439. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). Amplifying the
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The Supreme Court completed its movement away from the
rigorous American Banana approach in Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo.56 Filardo, an American citizen, contracted with a United
States corporation to work on construction projects in Iran and
Iraq. 57 The employment contract called for compliance with all
applicable United States laws. 5' Filardo sought compensation
under the Eight Hour Law 59 which provided for an overtime pay
rate beyond the eighth hour worked in a single day. 60
The Foley Brothers Court attempted to ascertain Congress's
unexpressed intent regarding the statute's transnational operation. 6 'The Court scrutinized a variety of interpretive sources, including the statute's plain language, overall scheme, legislative
history and relevant administrative interpretations.6 2 The Court
additionally referred to the overriding congressional concern
with domestic labor relations which surrounded the statute's enSupreme Court's concern with international comity, the Skiriotes Court set forth the
guiding principle upon which later courts relied in establishing the power of Congress to apply its statutes abroad. Id. at 73. The Court declared that "the United
States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct
of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights
of other nations or their nationals are not infringed." Id. Accord Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 587 (1953) (absent interference with foreign countries and their citizens, Congress is entitled to place statutory obligations upon United States citizens
abroad); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952) (extraterritoriality of a statute rests in a judicial determination of whether Congress intended to use
its recognized power to apply the statute in foreign countries).
56 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). The Foley Brothers Court declared that "[tihe canon
of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained." Id. (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932)).
57 Id. at 283.
58 Id. The employment contract did not address the issue of an increased overtime pay rate. Id.
59 Ch. 352, 27 Stat. 340, § 1 (1892) (currently codified at 40 U.S.C. § 328
(1988)).
60 Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 282-83. The contract did not expressly contain any of
the Eight Hour Law's provisions. Id. at 283.
61 See id. at 285. The Court acknowledged that Congress innately possessed the
authority to project the Eight Hour Law beyond the borders of the United States.
Id. at 284. Therefore, the Court declared, the relevant question was whether Congress intended to exercise this inherent sovereign power. Id. at 284-85.
62 Id. at 285-90. The Court dismissed the contention that the statute's express
application to "every contract" called for an extraterritorial construction of the
Eight Hour Law. Id. at 287. Rather, the Court argued that the apparent broadness
of such language, unsupported by any other transnational evidence in the statute's
legislative history, failed to provide the requisite insight into the alleged unexpressed extraterritorial intent of Congress. Id.
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actment 63 and to the failure of relevant Executive Orders to specify the law's transnational operation. 64 Emphasizing that the
statute's work hours regulation failed to distinguish between citizen and alien employees,65 the Foley Brothers Court concluded that
Congress did not intend the Eight Hour Law to apply
extraterritorially.6 6
Whereas the Foley Brothers Court declined to interpret the
Eight Hour Law as having transnational effect, a mere three years
later, the Court in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc. ,6' determined
that Congress intended the Lanham Act 6 8 to protect United
States nationals from trademark infringement occurring
abroad. 69 The plaintiff, a United States watch manufacturer,
claimed that the defendant, an American citizen, produced and
sold watches in Mexico stamped with the "Bulova" trademark in
63 Id. at 286-88. The Court noted that Congress created the Act to ameliorate
labor unrest in the United States resulting from domestic unemployment and the
flood of inexpensive foreign labor. Id. at 286-87.
64 Id. at 288-89. The Court explained that whereas many Executive Orders addressed the Eight Hour Law's application in various territories and possessions of
the United States, no such directives dealt with the operation of the statute in foreign countries. Id. at 288.
65 Id. at 286. The Court reasoned that the Eight Hour Law would have differentiated between citizens and aliens if Congress had intended to extend its regulatory
authority beyond the United States into locales where labor conditions are not the
normal concern of Congress. Id.
66 Id. at 290. In a concurring opinion,Justice Frankfurter argued that policy considerations should supersede the language of the statute as the primary interpretive
guide. Id. at 292 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter proclaimed that
without an unequivocal statement of congressional policy to the contrary, the Court
should not impose the employment standards of the United States on entities not
generally subject to Congress's regulatory authority. Id.
67 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
68 Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, § 1 (1946) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051
(1988)). The owner of a trademark used in commerce must register the mat k with
the Patent and Trademark Office in order to qualify for the infringement protections of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a). The express intent of Congress in
the Act was:
[To regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making
actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged
in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and
deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair competition entered
into between the United States and foreign nations.
Id.
69 Steele, 344 U.S. at 286.
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violation of the statute. 70 The Court posited that the statute's express regulation of any commerce within congressional control
secured extraterritorial application. 7 1 The Court noted that the
Act defined "commerce" as "all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress. 7 2 The Steele Court maintained that such
expansive jurisdictional language evidenced congressional intent
to regulate the trademark infringement practices of American citizens occurring on foreign soil. 73 Further, the Steele Court declared that the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act and
the domestic law of foreign countries did not conflict. 4
In 1957, the Court in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A. 75
accepted the Steele charge and pronounced a test for transnational intent focusing on whether a statute's extraterritorial application encumbered international accord and foreign
relations. 76 In Benz, the German and British crew of a Liberianflagged vessel demanded changes in its employment agreement,
made in Germany under British law, and went on strike against
its Panamanian employer while the ship was temporarily docked
70 Id. at 281-82. The defendant argued that the United States courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that his registration of the "Bulova" trademark in Mexico precluded a suit against him in the United States. Id. at 282.
71 Id. at 283. The Court described the regulatory authority of Congress under
the Lanham Act as entailing "broad jurisdictional powers." Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1988) (congressional power to proscribe trademark infringement extends to all
marks within commerce under the control of Congress).
72 Steele, 344 U.S. at 284. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988)). The Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "[tihe Congress shall have
Power To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Consequently, the jurisdictional grant of the Lanham Act naturally implicated the regulatory power of
Congress over commerce involving foreign countries. See Steele, 344 U.S. at 284.
73 Id. at 286. The Court observed that the defendant's Mexican operations created a significant impact upon the United States market by filtering the counterfeit
watches into the United States, resulting in increased competition. Id. The Court
described the Lanham Act as encompassing a "sweeping reach" and concluded that
the defendant's illicit activities fell within the regulatory umbrella of the Act's
"broad jurisdictional grant." Id. at 286-87.
74 Id. at 289 (citations omitted). The Court explained that because the Mexican
courts revoked the defendant's Mexican registration of the "Bulova" trademark,
the transnational execution of Title VII would not displace the domestic law of a
foreign country. Id. Thus, the Court set the foundation for judicial consideration of
international comity as a significant factor in a statute's transnational application.
Id.
75 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
76 Id. at 147. The Benz Court summarized that "to run interference in such a
delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed." Id.
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in Portland, Oregon." The foreign crew and its union sought
protection from the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA). 78 The Benz Court pointed to the likelihood that pervasive transnational turmoil would result from LMRA imposition
upon an employment contract tenuously and arbitrarily tied to
the United States. 79 The Court announced that there must be an
affirmative, clear expression of transnational intent for the Court
to interfere in the highly sensitive area of international
relations.80
The Benz Court, however, did not find the requisite statement of intent. 8 1 The Court declared that neither the LMRA's
language nor its legislative history revealed a congressional intent to provide LMRA protection for noncitizens employed
under foreign law on foreign vessels.82 Thus, under Benz, if the
statute's extraterritorial application would disrupt international
comity, the statute must contain a clear expression of transna77 Id. at 139. The crew sought a reduction in its service term, a wage increase
and better working conditions. Id. The crew's employment agreement incorporated standard wage and hour provisions established by the British Maritime
Board. Id.
78 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988) (originally codified at 61 Stat. 136, ch. 120, § 1
(1947)). The trial court found that because repair and loading crews declined to
cross the picket line of the foreign sailors and their union representatives, the vessel and its cargo were damaged. Benz, 353 U.S. at 139. The union claimed that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction because it was pre-empted by the LMRA. Id. The trial
court entered judgment against the defendant union for damages, maintaining that
the LMRA did not apply to the employment of non-citizens on foreign vessels. Id.
See Note, supra note 36, at 1480 ("[tlhe LMRA represents a legislative balance between the competing collective interests of labor and management, based on a policy valuing minimal government intrusion in the United States employment
environment").
79 Benz, 353 U.S. at 142, 147. The Benz Court proclaimed that the fortuitous
placement of the vessel in an American port at the outbreak of the labor dispute
created a situation in which "the possibilities of international discord are so evident
and retaliative action so certain." Id.
80 Id. at 147. Observing the undisputed, but discretionary, power of Congress to
apply a statute to a foreign vessel in American waters, the Court maintained that "if
Congress had so chosen, it could have made the Act applicable to wage disputes
arising on foreign vessels between nationals of other countries when the vessel
comes within our territorial waters." Id. at 142. The Benz Court reasoned that "[t]he
question... therefore narrows to one of intent of the Congress as to the coverage
of the Act." Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. The Court noted that the LMRA's entire background reflected congressional concern with employment discord between American workers and corporations. Id. at 143-44. The Court determined that it could not "read into the Labor
Management Relations Act an intent to change the contractual provisions made by
these parties .... We, therefore, conclude that any such appeal should be directed
to the Congress rather than the courts." Id. at 146-47.
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The Court continued to assert the Benz doctrine in McCulloch
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras.8 4 In McCulloch, Hon-

duran sailors attempted to gain union representation via the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 8 5 while working on
Honduran-registered vessels legally owned and operated by a
foreign subsidiary of a United States corporation. 86 Despite vehement objection by foreign governments, the National Labor Relations Board granted the foreign sailors' petition and ordered a
union election pursuant to NLRA regulations.8 7 The McCulloch
Court first observed the substantial disruption in international
comity that the NLRA's extraterritorial application had already
created and would continue to generate. 8 8 The Court further

noted that administering the NLRA against all foreign vessels in
American ports would provoke profound conflicts of maritime
law and international relations.8 9 As a result, the McCulloch Court
employed the Benz standard and demanded an explicit statement
of transnational intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 90 Further complying with the Benz mandate, the
83 See id. at 147. Absent the instigation of international discord, the Foley Brothers
approach presumably still controls; Congress's extraterritorial intent need not be
explicitly stated, but rather may be ascertained from all of the available indicia of
legislative intent. See EEOC v. Aramco, Ill S. Ct. 1227, 1240 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (rather than the stringent Benz approach, the Foley Brothers weak presumption governs where statute's transnational operation would not interfere with
foreign law).
84 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
85 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Driven by decades of violent labor unrest in the
United States, Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 to remedy the exploitation of
American workers. See Ordman, Fifty Years of the NLRA: An Overview, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 15, 16 (1985). The NLRA granted to workers the right to organize and to
have their own representatives bargain collectively on their behalf. Id. at 18. Moreover, the Act prohibited both management and unions from engaging in unfair
labor practices. Id. at 19. Through the NLRA, Congress "fostered an industrial democracy." Id. at 18.
86 McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 12, 13. A bargaining agreement between the Honduran
subsidiary and Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, the defendant labor
union, set forth the provisions of the sailors' employment contracts. Id. at 14.
87 Id. at 12, 16-17.
88 Id. at 19. The Court described the transnational operation of the NLRA as
triggering "highly charged international circumstances." Id. at 21.
89 Id. at 19. The McCulloch Court also relied on the statement of Chief Justice
Marshall in The Charming Betsy case that " 'an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.' "
Id. at 21 (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804)).
90 Id. at 21-22. The Court stated that "for us to sanction the exercise of local
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McCulloch Court examined both the statute's language and its
legislative history for the necessary clear intent but concluded
that neither source evinced the requisite showing. 9 '
Against this framework of statutory interpretation, the
Supreme Court decided EEOC v. Aramco.92 The Aramco Court
considered whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 9" contained an extraterritorial reach and regulated the practices of
United States employers regarding American citizens employed
abroad.94 The Aramco majority held that the conduct of United
States corporations employing American citizens abroad is not
subject to Title VII restrictions.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist initially
identified the Court's duty as one of statutory interpretation.96
The Chief Justice stated that the Court must determine whether
Congress intended the Title VII employment safeguards to protect American citizens working abroad for United States employers. 97 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the Court must
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality such that a congressional statute will apply only within United States boundaries
unless a clear, affirmative statement of contrary intent exists.98
sovereignty under such conditions in this 'delicate field of international relations
there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.' "Id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957)).
91 Id. at 19. The Court, therefore, declared that the National Labor Relations
Board lacked the jurisdiction to conduct a union election for alien workers on a
foreign ship. Id. at 22.
92 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
93 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
94 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1229. See supra note 27-29 and accompanying text.
95 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter. Id. Justice Scalia concurred in part and in the judgment. Id. Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, dissented. Id.
96 Id. at 1230. The Court noted that Congress unquestionably has the power to
execute its statutes outside the United States. Id. (citations omitted). Such a declaration mirrors that of several other cases involving the proposed transnational application of a statute. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963) (regulatory authority of Congress in the National
Labor Relations Act reaches the crews of foreign-flagged ships in American waters);
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-83 (1952) (Congress possesses the
power to extend its laws beyond the United States in regulating the practices of
American citizens); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (United
States subpoena and contempt powers can compel a citizen living abroad to return
to the United States).
97 Id.
98 Id. (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957)). The Court's articulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality focused on the Foley Brothers " 'canon of construction,' " from which the majority re-
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Examining whether Title VII expressed such an intent, ChiefJustice Rehnquist focused on the EEOC's three-pronged contention
that a finding of extraterritorial intent was directed by Title VII's
broad jurisdictional definitions, its alien exemption provision and
traditional notions of judicial deference to the EEOC's statutory
construction. 99
The majority first considered the EEOC's claim that Title
VII's expansive definition of commerce as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among
the several States; or between a State and any place outside
thereof,"' 0 0 clearly evidenced a congressional intent to extend
the Title VII safeguards abroad.' 0 ' Describing the statute's definitions as "boilerplate," Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that
the alleged Title VII expression of extraterritorial intent mirrored the language of several other statutes which were all territorially construed. 0 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist disregarded the
quired a "clearly expressed" intent on the part of Congress to apply a statute
beyond the United States. Id. (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353
U.S. 138, 147 (1957); Foley Bros., Inc., v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
99 Id. at 1230-31.
100 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1982).
101 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1231. Aramco countered with three alternate interpretations. Id. First, Congress did not intend the phrase "or between a State and any
place outside thereof' to pertain to employment practices entirely within a foreign
country. Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 21 n.14). Second, Title VII's manifest
lack of the term "foreign" as applied to commerce or industry belies any extraterritorial intent. Id. Third, the Senate removed the terms "foreign commerce" and
"foreign nations" from the bill before passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a clear
indication that Congress meant for Title VII to apply territorially. Id. (citing Brief
for Respondents at 7).
102 Id. at 1231-32. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2052
(a)(12) (1988) (providing that "[tIhe term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, or transportation (A) between a place in a State any place outside thereof,
or (B) which affects trade, traffic, commerce, or transportation described in subparagraph (A)"); Transportation Safety Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. App. § 1802 (2) (1988)
(defining "commerce" as "trade, traffic, commerce, or transportation, within the
jurisdiction of the United States (A) between a place in a State any place outside of
such State, or (B) which affects trade, traffic, commerce, or transportation described in clause (A)"); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
29 U.S.C. § 402 (a) (1988) (stating that " '[c]ommerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or
between any State and any place outside thereof"); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (b) (1988) (providing that "[tjhe term 'interstate commerce' means (1) commerce between any State or Territory and any place outside
thereof, and (2) commerce within the District of Columbia or within any other Territory not organized with a legislative body"); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1) (1990) (explaining that "commerce means travel,
trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication (A) among the several
States; (B) between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any
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assertion that Title VII's broad jurisdictional language disclosed
transnational intent and concluded that the statute's boilerplate
definitions failed to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 0 3 The Court also based its decision on prior case
law. i°4 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Supreme Court's
multifarious rulings on the presumption required a statute to include an unequivocal revelation of an extraterritorial intent and
maintained that Title VII's "commerce" definition evinced no
0 5
such intent.
Moreover, the majority distinguished Title VII from the Lanham Act, which the Steele Court construed as extraterritorially intended. 0 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist illustrated that Title VII
lacked the Lanham Act's jurisdictional grant of "all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.' 0t 7 Chief Justice
Rehnquist accentuated the language's expansiveness by emphasizing that the Constitution expressly granted congressional
power to regulate commerce within foreign countries. 08 The
majority reiterated that Title VII's nonspecific language did
not constitute a clear expression of congressional intent to provide the statute with extraterritorial effect.' 0 9 Consequently, the
Court concluded that Title VII's assertedly broad jurisdictional
against
presumption
the
defeat
did
not
language
0
extraterritoriality. "
State; or (C) between points in the same State but through another State or foreign
country").
103 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1231.
104

Id. 1232.

Id. at 1233. As support for its territorial construction of Title VII, the majority
pointed to several statutes that contained jurisdictional language as expansive as
that of Title VII but which were held to apply only territorially. Id. at 1231-32. See
supra note 102.
106 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1232-33 (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344
105

U.S. 280, 285, 287 (1952)). For a discussion of the Steele case, see supra notes 67-74
and accompanying text. Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed as "unpersuasive" the
Commission's argument that there is a link between Title VII and the Lanham Act.
Id. at 1232.
107 Id. at 1232-33. The Court observed that Title VII, in contrast to the Lanham
Act, expressly derived its definition of "commerce" from the territorially construed

LMRA. Id. at 1233 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 373 U.S. 10, 15 (1963)).
108 Id. at 1232. See supra note 71.
109 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1233.

I 10 Id. The majority explained:

Many acts of Congress are based on the authority of that body to regulate commerce among the several States, and the parts of these acts
setting forth the basis for legislative jurisdiction will obviously refer to

such commerce in one way or another. If we were to permit possible,
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Chief Justice Rehnquist next addressed the EEOC's second
claim that extraterritoriality was implied in the alien exemption
provision which provided that Title VII's restrictions "shall not

apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any State.""' The EEOC contended that Congress
would not have created such a statutory exception unless it intended to grant extraterritorial protection to at least one category of employees, presumably American citizens. 112 The Court,
however, declined to endorse the view that the alien exemption
provision illustrated congressional intent to protect American
1
citizens employed abroad by United States corporations.' '
Rather, insisting that a strict reading of Title VII would make the
statute applicable to foreign employees in foreign countries,
Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to support a statutory construction implicating problematic matters of international relations.' "4
As further evidence of Title VII's strict territorial nature,
or even plausible interpretations of language such as that involved
here to override the presumption against extraterritorial application,
there would be little left of the presumption.
Id.
'"
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982)). The alien exemption provision provides in full:
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
112 Aramco, 111 S.Ct. at 1233. Aramco responded with two alternate explanations. Id. First, the alien exemption clause relates only to aliens working for U.S.
employers in U.S. "possessions" which are not "states" under the definitions of
Title VII. Id. at 1233. Second, the provision serves as a confirmation of Title VII
coverage for alien workers in the United States. Id. at 1234 (citing Brief for Respondents at 26).
113 Id.
114 Id. The Court remarked that Title VII contains no facial distinction between
American employers and foreign employers, nor is there any evidence that the
EEOC proffered a viable rationale for the distinction. Id. Title VII's express definition of "employer" lacked any reference to "American", or "foreign." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (b) (1982). The statute provides:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term
does not include (1) the United States, [or] a corporation wholly
owned by the Government of the United States ...,or (2) a bona fide
private membership club (other than a labor organization) ....

110
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Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized both the statute's affirmative
provisions and omissions.'" 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist declared
that Congress' exclusively domestic intent manifested itself in
several statutory clauses. 1 6 For example, the Court noted that
one section' 17 precluded Title VII application from interfering
with state or local laws unless such laws effected a result prohibited by Title VII. l8 Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed another section" t9 which provided that Title VII should
20
not hinder the execution of state law consistent with Title VII.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist further discerned that Congress failed to
include certain statutory elements in Title VII, such as the term
"foreign" as applied to countries or proceedings. 12 ' Moreover,
the majority emphasized that Congress did not place any tools
for Title VII transnational enforcement at the EEOC's disposal. 1 22 The majority argued that the venue provision 23 did not
115 Aramco, I1I S. Ct. at 1234.
116

Id.

117 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982). The statute provides:

Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by
any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a
State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the
doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice
under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982).
118 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1234.
119 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1982). The statute provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any
such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject
matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating
any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with
any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
Id.
120 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1234. The Court also listed 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5 as
indicative of territorial intent. Id. Under this provision, when examining an allegation of employment discrimination, the EEOC must impart "substantial weight" to
the pronouncements of state or local officials made in proceedings initiated under
state or local law. Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The venue provision provides in pertinent part:
Each United States district court and each United States court of a
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may
be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful
employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice
are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which
the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful
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display an intent to apply Title VII abroad because it limited
venue to the judicial district where certain specified events pertaining to the cause of action occurred.' 2 4 The Court also recognized that the EEOC's subpoena power was confined to the
United States and its territories.125 As a final example of congressional silence, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Title VII did not provide statutory guidelines for dealing with
conflicts between Title VII and foreign law.' 26 The Court concluded that these
examples inherently contradicted an extraterri2
torial intent.

1

Moving from its lengthy language examination, the Court
next considered the appropriate standard of deference to the
EEOC's statutory construction. 28 Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the level of judicial deference depended largely on
the consistency of earlier interpretations. 29 Consequently, the
employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any
such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district
in which the respondent has his principal office.
Id.

124 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1234. Title VII allows for venue in the judicial district
where the alleged discrimination took place, where the employment records related
to the allegedly discriminatory conduct are kept, where the employee would have
worked except for such conduct or where the employer's principal office is located.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982).
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9. Pursuant to a cross-reference within Title VII, the
subpoena power of the Commission is identical to that of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) under the NLRA. Id. Title VII provides in relevant part that
"[fQor the purposes of all hearings and investigations conducted by the Commission
or its duly authorized agents or agencies, section 161 of Title 29 shall apply." Id.
Accordingly, the NLRA states:
Any member of the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the
Board for such purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive witnesses. Such attendance of witnesses
and the production of such evidence may be required from any place
in the United States or any Territory or possession thereof, at any
designated place of hearing.
29 U.S.C. § 161 (1) (1988).
126 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1234. The Court contrasted Title VII with the amended
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) which expressly provides
for foreign law to displace the ADEA when the two are in conflict. Id. (citing ADEA,
Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, § 41(0(1) (1967) (currently codified at 29 U.S.C.
623(f)(1) (1988)).
127 Id. at 1234.
128 Id. at 1235.
129 Id. The majority relied on the elements of the deference test enunciated in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The General Electric Court announced that the level of deference due a federal agency's interpretation of a statute turns on " 'the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' "
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Court expressed concern over the EEOC's antithetical pro30
nouncements regarding Title VII's extraterritorial application.1
Chief Justice Rehnquist juxtaposed a 1971 EEOC statementthat Title VII anti-discrimination protections cover "all individuals, both citizens and noncitizens, domiciled or residing in the
United States" 3 '-with the Commission's later declarations that
3 2
the statute applied abroad.
Based on the inconsistency, Chief Justice Rehnquist refused
to embrace the EEOC's transnational interpretation and deemed
it unpersuasive because it did not rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 1 33 Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted that the
EEOC's recent extraterritorial proclamations deserved some attention; nevertheless, the Chief Justice dismissed the assertion
that they constituted a clearly expressed congressional intent to
apply Title VII abroad. 1 34 Mindful of Congress's previous expressions of extraterritorial intent,1 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist
GeneralElectric, 429 U.S. at 142 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)). Noting that the guidelines of the EEOC are entitled to some consideration
in ascertaining congressional intent, the General Electric Court nevertheless asserted
that "courts properly may accord less weight to such guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the force of law, see Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 484 (1942), or to regulations which under
the enabling statute may themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability." Id.
at 141 (citation omitted).
130 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1235.
131 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(c) (1971).
132 See Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1235. The EEOC argued that its extraterritorial interpretation of Title VII appeared consistently in several contexts: a 1975 letter of the
General Counsel of the EEOC, the EEOC Chairman's testimony in 1983, a decision
rendered by the agency in 1985 and a 1989 Policy Statement, all of which called for
Title VII to regulate abroad. Id.
133 Id. The majority declared that "[tihe EEOC's interpretation of the statute
here thus has been neither contemporaneous with its enactment nor consistent
since the statute came into law." Id. Although acknowledging that the interpretive
weight of the Commission's various extraterritorial proclamations should not be
dismissed entirely, the Court emphasized that their "persuasive value is limited
when judged by the standards set forth in Skidmore." Id. (citations omitted).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1235 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)). The ChiefJustice discussed several statutes which Congress specifically imparted with transnational effect, such as the Export Administration Act and the amended ADEA. Id. at 1235-36. See Export Administration Act, 50
U.S.C. App. § 2415(2) (1982) (covering every "United States person," defined as
"any United States resident or national (other than an individual resident outside
the United States and employed by other than a United States person), any domestic concern (including any permanent domestic establishment of any foreign concern) and any foreign subsidiary or affiliate (including any permanent foreign
establishment) of any domestic concern which is controlled in fact by such domestic
concern .... "); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)
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noted no such exercise in Title VII and concluded that the relevant evidence represented thoroughly
unconvincing support for
i3 6
Title VII application abroad.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia sought to clarify the
third prong of the majority's analysis which addressed the deference granted to the EEOC's statutory interpretation.' 7 Justice
Scalia argued that an agency's interpretation should be granted
deference wherever reasonable, taking into consideration the
traditional judicial canons of construction. 3 8 Remarking that
"deference is not abdication,"'' 39 Justice Scalia maintained that
the EEOC generally deserved greater deference than that conferred by the majority. 140 Justice Scalia concluded, however, that
such deference would be unreasonable in this case because the
presumption could not4 be rebutted without a clear expression of
congressional intent. ' '
(providing that "[t]he term 'employee' means an individual employed by any employer ... includ[ing] any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed
by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country").
136 Aramco, Ill S. Ct. at 1236.
'37 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia
disapproved of the majority's focus on the mere persuasive power, or lack thereof,
in the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII. Id. Charging that the majority misapplied
General Electric, Justice Scalia maintained that the guidelines of a non-rulemaking
agency are not tantamount to legislative regulations. Id. (citing General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976)).
138 Id. at 1236-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quoting EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)). The
Commercial Office Products Court stated that "the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII,
for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by
grammatical or any other standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference." EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988). Noting the majority's failure to
address the deference standard advanced by Commercial Office Products,Justice Scalia
commented that because "Commercial Office Products has not been overruled (or even
mentioned) in today's opinion ....
the state of the law regarding deference to the
EEOC is left unsettled." Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1236 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron Court stated that where Congress expressly authorizes a federal agency to promulgate regulations under a
statute, a court may disregard the regulations only if they are arbitrary, capricious,
or clearly opposed by the statute. Id. at 843-44. The Chevron Court explained, however, that where Congress implicitly imparts to an agency the power to interpret a
statute through regulations, such regulations must be afforded deference if reasonably constructed. Id. at 844.
139 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1237 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
140 See id. Justice Scalia maintained that "I would resolve these cases by assuming,
without deciding, that the EEOC was entitled to deference on the particular point
in question." Id.
.141 Id. Justice Scalia stated that the presumption's requirement of a clear expres-
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In a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall denounced the majority's "reformulation" of the presumption and asserted that the
Court incorrectly required a clear statement of extraterritorial intent where the circumstances did not call for such a strict approach. 142 Agreeing that congressional intent was the dispositive
issue, Justice Marshall declared that the presumption against extraterritoriality took effect only after all indications of legislative
intent were exhausted. 143 Justice Marshall explained that consideration of extraterritorial intent must initially focus on any available extrinsic guides, such as the circumstances surrounding the
statute's enactment, the legislative history or administrative interpretations. 44 Applying these guides to Title VII, Justice Marshall concluded that Congress
clearly intended the statute to
14
operate extraterritorially.

1

Justice Marshall initially examined the presumption's history. 1 46 Recognizing two distinct versions of the presumption,
the dissent identified the relevant inquiry as whether the statute's
extraterritorial application would interfere with or displace a foreign country's domestic law. 147 Justice Marshall posited that if
the statute's operation would not interfere, a court should implesion of transnational intent rendered it unreasonable for the Court "to give effect
to mere implications from the statutory language as the EEOC has done." Id.
142 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting).Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens. Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1238 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the Court's treatment of Foley Brothers, claiming that the Foley Brothers Court's consideration of an
entire panoply of intent-indicative factors, before drawing upon the presumption
against extraterritoriality, was inconsistent with a construction of the presumption
as a clear statement rule. Id. at 1237-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A clear statement
rule, Justice Marshall observed, prevents a court from searching external elements
for congressional intent. Id. Justice Marshall further posited that the Foley Brothers
Court's analysis of the Eight Hour Law's overall scheme, legislative history and
nondistinction between citizens and aliens, as well as its thorough examination of
administrative interpretations, all contradicted the application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality as a clear statement rule. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
145 Id. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 1237-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall initially explained
that the majority's reworking of the presumption enabled the Court to impart a lack
of extraterritorial intent to certain omissions within Title VII, such as the term "foreign" as appended to "nations" or "proceedings." Id. at 1237 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
147 See id. at 1240 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 36, at 147677 ("a court must proceed on an ad hoc basis to resolve whether congressional
intent for extraterritorial jurisdiction exists under the particular facts and circumstances at issue," employing the clear expression test only where a statute would
engender international contention if applied in foreign countries).
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ment the Foley Brothers "weak presumption" and thereby scrutinize all available indications of extraterritorial intent before
raising the presumptive barrier. 4 ' Justice Marshall explained
that the Foley Brothers decision did not rest on the existence of a
clear statement of intent but rather on the totality of the circumstances, including the statute's legislative history, overall composition and relevant administrative interpretations. 149
Further, the dissent set forth the appropriate interpretive
framework for courts confronted with a statute's extraterritorial
application that would impede the operation of foreign law."50
Justice Marshall stated that where such application would frustrate international comity notions, a court should use the clear
statement standard to ascertain the legislative intent rather than
the less exacting Foley Brothers approach.' 5 ' Acknowledging the
coexistent, but entirely independent, nature of the two construc148 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1240 (MarshallJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall stressed
that the Court in Foley Brothers considered the presumption against extraterritoriality to be a valid approach " 'whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained.' " Id. at 1238 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
149 Id. The dissent elucidated the difference between a clear statement rule and
the Foley Brothers approach by contrasting several examples of the former with the
latter. See id. See also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (legislative history
of the Education of the Handicapped Act is inapposite in ascertaining congressional intent to abolish Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because the requisite intent "must be both unequivocal and textual"); EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
("[w]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) ("heightened showing" of clear intent is required
where Congress seeks to constrain review of constitutional claims by the courts);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 243 (1985) (congressional
duty in statutory override of an Eleventh Amendment right is to render such "intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute," that is, to "unequivocally
express" its intent); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (Congress must state
its intent to abridge a citizen's associational freedoms "in explicit terms").
150 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1239 (Marshall,J, dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)).
151 Id. In Benz, the Court refused to construe the Labor Management Relations
Act as intended to control labor disputes on foreign vessels between foreign
seamen and their foreign employers due to the strong probability of resultant international turmoil. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 146-47
(1957). The Benz Court promulgated a demanding rule of statutory construction,
available when extraterritorial application would implicate difficult issues of international comity. Id. at 147. The Court proclaimed that "[flor us to run interference
in such a delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed." Id. at 147. Similarly, the McCulloch Court required a "clear expression" of congressional intent to extend the
National Labor Relations Act to alien sailors working on foreign ships due to the
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tions, Justice Marshall determined that the majority incorrectly
imposed the higher standard. 5 2 The Justice stressed that the
Benz-McCulloch approach was inappropriate because Title VII's
transnational application would not displace the domestic law of
any foreign countries. 153 Justice Marshall charged that the construction utilized by the majority enabled the Court to circumvent the requisite initial analysis regarding international comity,
a determination that would have bound the Court to either the
54
Benz-McCulloch or Foley Brothers approach.1
Asserting that Title VII extraterritorial application would
not interfere with foreign law because of the statute's focus on
United States nationals, 15 5 Justice Marshall proceeded to examine the relevant indications of congressional intent evident in
the statute's language, legislative history and EEOC interpretations. 156 justice Marshall contended that the express inclusion of
commerce "between a State and any place outside thereof,"
within the range of Title VII-protected conduct, revealed Conextant "highly charged international circumstances." McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 12, 21-22 (1963).
152 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1238-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall criticized the majority for resorting to "selective quotation" to enunciate its clear statement version of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 1238 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Pointing to its failure to consider the full language and effect of prior
decisions, Justice Marshall emphasized that whereas the majority claimed that the
Court in both Chisholm and McCulloch inspected only the language of the relevant
statutes for transnational intent, the Court in those cases actually dealt with, respectively, "the circumstances" involved in the statute's enactment, and the statute's
"extensive legislative history," as indicators of congressional intent. Id. at 1238-39
(Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1962); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S.
29, 31 (1924)). Conversely, the Foley Brothers Court sought to determine the unexpressed extraterritorial intent of Congress by analyzing statutory language, legislative history and administrative interpretations. Foley Bros., Inc v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285-90 (1949).
153 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1239 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that
the extraterritorial operation of Title VII would not disrupt international comity
because the statute only pertains to American nationals abroad. Id.
154 Id. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500, 501 (1979)
(confronted with a statutory challenge of prominent national interests, the Court
must rely on its "prudential policy" of requiring a clear expression of congressional
intent to grant jurisdiction over a dispute arising under the statute).
155 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1239. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)
(Congress may regulate the conduct of American citizens abroad unless such regulation interferes with the rights of foreign countries or foreign citizens).
156 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1240-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Within its consideration of the language of Title VII, the dissent analyzed the statute's definitions and
the alien exemption provision. Id. at 1240 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall concluded that these elements exhibited the transnational intent of Congress.
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gress's extraterritorial intent. 57 Moreover, Justice Marshall proclaimed that the negative inference drawn from the alien
exemption provision, suggesting that Congress intended to protect American workers abroad, clearly defeated the presumption. 158 Justice Marshall stressed that Congress would not have
designed an exemption if it did not intend to bestow transnational protection upon a category of employees other than
aliens. 159 Reviewing the clause's legislative history, the dissent argued that the provision's stated purpose to preclude conflicts of
law arising from a United States corporation's employment of a
foreign national abroad, further reflected congressional intent to
apply Title VII extraterritorially. 6 °
Justice Marshall then analyzed the legislature's alleged omissions. 16 ' The dissent rejected the majority's claim that Congress
failed to provide conflicts of law guidelines and noted that the
alien exemption provision's express objective was to prevent the
discordant operation of Title VII and the laws of foreign countries. 62 The dissent additionally recognized that venue was
157 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1982)). Justice Marshall also asserted that
Congress did not condition Title VII protection of an "individual" on any particular location of employment. Id. See supra note 4.
158 Aramco, Ill S. Ct. at 1240-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (statute's explicit inclusion of States within
covered "persons" constitutes sufficient expression of congressional intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of States).
159 Id. at 1240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 1241 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4) (1963)). Justice Marshall also criticized the majority's flawed treatment
of the alien exemption provision. Id. at 1242 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall dismissed the Court's insistence that the alien exemption provision functioned
merely to confirm statutory protection for aliens working inside the United States
as profoundly untenable, because Congress already covered such aliens by applying
Title VII to "any individual." Id. The dissent also declined to advocate the view that
Congress created a transnational exemption to express territorial coverage. Id.
Similarly, Justice Marshall addressed the contention that Congress enacted the
alien exemption provision to preclude the operation of Title VII in United States
possessions, which the statute does not cover in its definition of "State." Id. The
dissent noted that such a construction was allegedly mandated by the decision of
the Court in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 390 (1948) which held
that the term "possession" in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938),
encompassed leased military bases in foreign countries. Id. Justice Marshall explained that the majority's Vermilya-Brown objection to extraterritorial application of
Title VII served to reinforce the transnational intent of Congress because both possessions and foreign countries are subject to the same presumption against extraterritoriality. Id.
161 Id. at 1242-44 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
162 Id. at 1243 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1963)). Justice Marshall observed that the express purpose of the provision was " 'to remove conflicts of law which might otherwise exist between the
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proper in the judicial district of the employer's principal office 1 63
and that the statute empowered the EEOC to conduct its Title
VII duties at any location.' 6 4 Justice Marshall reasoned that the
majority incorrectly asserted that Congress intended a pure territorial scope for Title VII.' 6 5 Justice Marshall also de-emphasized
the territorial limitation of the EEOC's subpoena power' 6 6 and
contended that the agency's statutory subpoena power was unrelated to the statute's transnational reach.' 6 7 The Justice illustrated that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1 68 was
applied extraterritorially despite the statute's express language
limiting the EEOC's subpoena power to the United States

proper.169
Responding to the Court's concern over possible Title VII
application to foreign employers, Justice Marshall explained that
the coexisting Foley Brothers and Benz-McCulloch constructions determined a statute's extraterritoriality by first determining the
statute's impact if applied transnationally. 170 Thus, the dissent
maintained, where a statute purportedly regulates the conduct of
foreign nationals abroad and displaces the foreign country's domestic law, the strict Benz-McCulloch approach controls.' 7 ' The
strict approach, according to the dissent, required a clear statement of transnational intent to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 172 Justice Marshall declared, however,
that when applying the same statute to the conduct of American
nationals abroad, the less-restrictive Foley Brothers standard is
used. 173 Justice Marshall asserted that because the alien exempUnited States and a foreign nation in the employment of aliens outside the United
States by an American enterprise.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2303 (1963)).
163 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982)).
164 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Specifically, the EEOC may administer Title VII
at its main office in Washington, D.C., or "at any other place." Id. (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1982)).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1243-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 125.
167 Aramco, 111 S.Ct. at 1244 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). See supra note 135.
169 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1244 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b)
(1934). Justice Marshall also observed that although the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 does not grant transnational subpoena power to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Act is generally construed as applying abroad. Aramco, 111 S.Ct.
at 1244 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. The dissent asserted that the extraterritorial application of congressional
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tion provision applied both to the conduct of American enterprises

74

and

United

States

employers,

75

Congress

only

76
intended to regulate the practices of American corporations.
As a final justification, Justice Marshall addressed the
EEOC's Title VII interpretations. 77 Justice Marshall stressed
that the Commission's transnational Title VII interpretation exhibited a wholly consistent legislative history.7 8 The dissent explained that the 1971 EEOC regulation stating that Title VII
"protects all individuals, both citizens and noncitizens, domiciled
or residing in the United States,"' 79 eliminated noncitizenship
and residency as unprotected distinctions under Title VII's national origin safeguards. 8 0 Thus, Justice Marshall concluded that
statutes to American nationals implicates significantly fewer issues of international
comity than such application to foreign nationals. Id.
174 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963).
175 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1964)).
176 Id. Justice Marshall opined that "although the issue is not before us in this
case, we would not be at a loss for interpretive resources for narrowing Title VII's
extraterritorial reach to United States employers should such a construction be
necessary to avoid conflicts with foreign law." Id.
177 Id. at 1244-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also scrutinized the
Title VII construction promulgated by the Department of Justice, which, in its capacity as the subordinate Title VII-enforcement agency, advanced the principle that
the statute applied beyond the boundaries of the United States. Id. at 1245 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
178 Id. at 1245-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed that the
first enunciation of such an extraterritorial construction of the statute occurred in a
1975 letter of the agency's General Counsel. Id. at 1245 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The letter stated:
If [the alien exemption provision] is to have any meaning at all, therefore, it is necessary to construe it as expressing a Congressional intent
to extend the coverage of Title VII to include employment conditions
of citizens in overseas operations of domestic corporations at the
same time it excludes aliens of the domestic corporation from the operation of the statute.
Id. (quoting Letter from W. Carey, EEOC General Counsel, to Senator Frank
Church (Mar. 14, 1975)).
Justice Marshall further noted that the EEOC corroborated this initial interpretation in subsequent decisions and policy statements. Id. See EEOC Dec. No. 85-16
(Sept. 16, 1985); 38 FEP Cases 1889, 1891, 1892 (examination of Title VII's language reveals that "not only is there no specific exclusion in the Act that would bar
its extraterritorial application, a fair interpretation of the language of [the alien
exemption provision] leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to protect
U.S. citizens working abroad." Consequently, the Commission ruled that Title VII
"does apply to covered employers with respect to their employment of U.S. citizens
outside the United States").
179 Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(c) (1971)).
18o Id. at 1246 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority asserted that this same
language evidenced a territorial intent. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
Justice Marshall explained that "the EEOC could not have stated that Title VII
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Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to defer appropriately to the
EEOC's construction of Title VII.181
The critical difference between the polar views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall revolved around the Justices'
disparate treatment of the presumption against extraterritoriality.' s 2 As even a perfunctory comparison between Foley Brothers
and the Benz-McCulloch tandem demonstrates, a judge's reading
of the presumption constitutes an essential initial determination
8
that fixes his or her perspective on the statutory elements.'1
i8 4
Such a judicial dynamic was at work in Aramco.
It was in rendering this underlying assessment that the majority misapplied the presumption. The Aramco Court failed to
appreciate the crucial differentiating inquiry relating to the creation of international discord by a statute's transnational application. 8 5 An extraterritorial Title VII construction would not
disturb international comity because the statute expressly avoids
protects 'both citizens and noncitizens' from national-origin discrimination outside
the United States because such an interpretation would have been inconsistent with
the alien exemption provision." Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1245 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
181 Id.Justice Marshall described the majority's failure to give effect to the indications of extraterritorial intent in the language and legislative history of Title VII as
forging a presumption against extraterritoriality that is "a barrier to any genuine
inquiry into the sources that reveal Congress' actual intentions." Id.
182 Justice Marshall incorporated many of the principles relating to the assessment of legislative intent and the presumption against extraterritoriality set forth
by Judge King in the panel and en banc dissents in Boureslan. Justice Marshall's
Aramco dissent mirrored the approach of Judge King that "congressional intent to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction must be explicit only when such an exercise of
jurisdiction would violate international law. Where there is no conflict with international law, no explicit congressional authorization is needed." Gallozzi, supra note
17, at 378.
183 See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963) (Congress must clearly and affirmatively express its extraterritorial intent
where the transnational operation of a statute would interfere with the sovereignty
of a foreign nation); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957) (clear expression of transnational intent required to rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality if application of statute abroad would disturb international relations); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285-90 (1949) (unexpressed extraterritorial intent of Congress may be discerned through an
examination of the statutory language, legislative history and administrative
interpretations).
184 See EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991) (presumption against extraterritoriality requires a clear, affirmative expression of transnational intent to overcome
the presumption).
185 Indeed, the majority's approach to the presumption against extraterritoriality
typified the judicial tendency, when confronted with a statute silent on its transnational application, "to gravitate toward a narrow interpretation of the statute itself
and thereby circumvent thorny, unresolved questions of international law." Turley,
supra note 5, at 600-01.
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conflicts of law issues through the alien exemption provision and
the bona fide occupational qualification, 8 6 which relieves an employer's Title VII obligations where sex, religion or other charac87
teristic comprises a fundamental employment requirement.
Consequently, Congress's extraterritorial intent appears in the
alien exemption provision and the powerful negative inference
derived therefrom. Therefore, Congress only needed to exempt
Title VII protection for aliens abroad if the statute applied to
working in foreign countries for United States
American citizens
18 8
employers.
42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2(e) (1982). The BFOQ provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for
employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its
membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or
for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the
basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise ....
Id. See Comment, supra note 15, at 139 (1985) (corporation's claim that its employment discrimination is exempted by the BFOQ must meet three criteria: "(1) all or
substantially all members of a group must lack a desired characteristic; (2) the link
between the desired characteristic and the included group must not be based on
stereotypical assumptions; and (3) the desired characteristic must pertain to some
action which is essential to the given business").
187 See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'dmem.,
746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984). In Kern, an American pilot signed an employment
contract with a United States corporation which provided helicopters to oversee the
pilgrimage of Moslems into the holy city of Mecca. Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1197.
Saudi Arabian law prohibits all non-Moslems from entering the holy city under
penalty of death. Id. at 1198. Consequently, the corporation required all non-Moslem pilots to convert to Islam. Id. After refusing to convert, the plaintiff filed a
complaint with the EEOC and brought suit in the United States alleging employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Id. The district court declared that
since every non-Moslem pilot servicing Mecca faced a beheading upon entry into
the holy city, conversion to Islam for a non-Moslem pilot comprised an essential
prerequisite for such a pilot to complete his job safely. Id. at 1200. Thus, the court
concluded that the corporation's discrimination against non-Moslems fell within
the BFOQ exception of Title VII. Id. at 1201. See also Note, Equal Employment Opportunityfor Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1288, 1302, 1303 (1987) (neither stereotypical assumptions nor mere customer preference constitute a valid BFOQ).
188 See Note, supra note 36, at 1480. This commentator noted:
A primary difference between Title VII and the employment-related
statutes that have been denied extraterritorial application is Title
VII's explicit exclusion of aliens employed abroad. The restricted statutes contain no such exclusion and thus present no formal bar to extending United States jurisdiction from the United States plaintiff in
186
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The majority, however, incorrectly fashioned the presumption against extraterritoriality by misconstruing precedent and,
as Justice Marshall charged, grossly distorting 8 9 the extraterritorial intent requirement to demand a clear expression of such intent. 90 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored the co-existing
Foley Brothers and the Benz-McCulloch constructions. The Foley
Brothers Court promulgated one standard, the so-called weak presumption, for discerning "unexpressed congressional intent"' 9 '
and another standard, requiring "a clearly expressed purpose,"' 9 2 where a statute's transnational application would result
in the regulation of "labor conditions which are the primary concern of a foreign country."' 93 The latter standard was subsequently adopted as the Benz-McCulloch test. 9 4 While the Foley
Brothers Court stressed the Eight Hour Law's failure to distinguish between coverage of citizens and of aliens working
abroad,' 9 5 the Aramco Court dismissed the effect of the alien exemption provision, which explicitly denied Title VII protections
to aliens working abroad while impliedly granting extraterritorial
application of the statute to American citizens.19 6 Thus, the mathe case before the court to foreseeable alien plaintiffs claiming
United States statutory protections over their employment conditions
abroad. In Title VII litigation, however, the statute's explicit exclusion of alien employees abroad prevents the threat of such interference with the sovereignty of another nation over the employment of
its own nationals within its borders.

Id.
189 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190 See Prentice, The Muddled State of Title VII's Application Abroad, 41 LAB. L.J. 633,
640 (1990) ("the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws
should not be an especially strong one in the modern era unless there is a real
danger that such an application will infringe upon the sovereignty of foreign nations in some substantial way.").
191 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
192 Id. at 286.
'93 Id.
194 See supra notes 80, 90.
195 Foley Bros., Inc., 336 U.S. at 286. The Foley Brothers Court expressed concern
over the statute's potential application to foreign nationals, stating:
Unless we were to read a [citizen/alien] distinction into the statute we
should be forced to conclude ...that Congress intended to regulate
the working hours of a citizen of Iran who chanced to be employed on
The aba public work of the United States in that foreign land ....
sence of any distinction between citizen and alien labor indicates to us
that the statute was intended to apply only to those places where the
labor conditions of both citizen and alien employees are a probable
concern of Congress.
Id.
196 See Note, supra note 36, at 1473-74 (if merely applied to non-citizens in the
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jority erroneously disregarded the statutory element present in
Title VII, which the Foley Brothers Court found so glaringly absent
in the Eight Hour Law, a statute construed as entailing a mere
19 7
territorial scope.
The sources constituting the pre-Aramco rendition of the presumption against extraterritoriality presented the Supreme Court
with the opportunity to produce the desideratum of transnational
statutory interpretation, a principled, comprehensive explication
of the presumption and its dual applicability. 198 The Aramco
Court clearly declined to foster this objective.' 9 9 Attempting to
exhume the presumption from the majority's prohibitively strict
interpretation, however, Justice Marshall accurately delineated
the two distinct rules of construction, 0 0 one of which a court may
implement depending on whether the statute's extraterritorial
application interferes with a foreign nation's domestic law. 2 0 '
The Aramco Court's unwillingness to ascribe an extraterritorial intent to Congress's promulgation of Title VII signals a dire
period for Americans working for United States corporations
abroad. 20 2 As a result of the Aramco decision, American employees now forfeit Title VII protections when transferred or assigned abroad by their United States employers. Concomitantly,
the court has created a disincentive for Americans to relocate and
United States, and not to American employees abroad, the alien exemption provision would be superfluous and would deny the "more meaningful construction" of
Title VII).
197 See supra note 195.
198 See Note, supra note 36, at 1476. See also Turley, TransnationalDiscriminationand
the Economics of ExtraterritorialRegulation, 70 B.U.L. REV. 339, 392 (1990) ("The central problem with the presumption against extraterritoriality is not conflict with
other canons (though some exist), but the fragile theoretical basis upon which it
rests in the contemporary world. While the presumption may have had some historical relevance at its inception, there is no current support for the presumption's
underlying [territorialist] assumption about Congress's behavior or, more broadly,
the behavior of the world markets").
199 See EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991) (notwithstanding an extra-

territorially-applied statute's failure to interfere with foreign law, the statute must
contain the clearly expressed transnational intent of Congress in order to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality).
200 Id. at 1244 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201 See Note, supra note 36, at 1477 ("The first step in [the extraterritoriality]
analysis is to determine whether the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over the defendant would interfere with accepted jurisdictional principles of international law").
202 See Barbash, Same Boss, Different Rules: An Argument for ExtraterritorialExtension of
Title VII to Protect U.S. Citizens Employed Abroad by U.S. MultinationalCorporations, 30
VA. J. INT'L L. 479, 513 (1990) (all United States laws prohibiting employment dis-

crimination should be applied transnationally in order to protect American nationals working abroad from any type of inequitable conduct by American employers).
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work in a foreign country.20 3 Further, the Aramco decision will
place American employers at a distinct disadvantage in an increasingly global marketplace. 20 4 American employers may be
unable to induce their employees, particularly minorities, to work
abroad because of misgivings in surrendering Title VII's anti-discrimination shield. 20 5 As foreign assignment remains a necessary
employment condition, the need for Title VII protections abroad
203 See id. at 483 ("It is irrational that a U.S. employee who wishes to work in the
foreign office of a U.S. company is stripped of his or her right under Title VII to be
free from discrimination in the workplace"); Note, supra note 187, at 1296 ("because foreign service may be a prerequisite to promotion within the hierarchy of
American multinational enterprises, allowing companies to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin in the assignment of employees abroad
will often lead to discriminatory promotional practices at home").
204 While Aramco creates serious problems for American employers in one regard,
the decision impermissibly shelters flagrant employment discrimination by United
States corporations against their American employees, as long as the practice occurs on foreign soil. See Barbash, supra note 202, at 508. Professor Barbash specifically noted:
Companies incorporated in America but based overseas should not be
able to use their location to thwart the reach of Title VII. Such multinational corporations must not be allowed to abuse their employees
while companies located in the United States, both domestic and foreign-owned, are required by law to treat their employees in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
See id. See also Note, supra note 36, at 1481 (extending Title VII abroad would effectuate the underlying remedial nature of the statute and would deter further discriminatory employment practices by United States corporations in foreign
countries).
205 Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1027 (5th Cir. 1988) (King, J., dissenting). In a panel dissent, Judge King objected to the majority's failure to extend
Title VII extraterritorially by way of illustration and declared that two American
employees of a U.S. corporation, one working in the United States, the other working in a foreign country, could suffer the same discriminatory acts, while only the
former would have recourse under Title VII. Id. Judge King continued:
(T]his situation creates a dilemma for minorities and women: foreign
assignments will be less attractive, while refusal of such an assignment
could limit an individual's opportunity for advancement.... Extraterritorial application of Title VII may therefore be necessary to ensure
that members of protected groups have equal opportunity with respect to foreign assignments that would affect their employment opportunities in the United States.
Id. See Turley, supra note 198, at 389-90 ("Millions of United States citizens work
outside the country and tens of millions are vulnerable to transfer overseas. The
presumption places all employees in a perverse position. Companies desiring to
discriminate will be able to use employee refusal to transfer abroad as a legitimate
cause for termination. If, on the other hand, a minority employee accepts the reassignment, the company can then fire the employee for overtly discriminatory reasons if it so wishes"); Comment, The Multinational Enterprise and Title VII Equal
Employment Opportunitiesfor Americans at Home and Abroad, 4 EMORY INrr'L L. REV. 373,
410 (1990) ("The only reasonable interpretation of Title VII is to apply it
extraterritorially").
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has never been greater than on the eve of the European community consolidation and the extraordinary challenges and opportunities that such an event presents American business. 2 6 The
Aramco Court's refusal to apply Title VII extraterritorially undermines a most vital statutory catalyst which had secured the American employment relationship from discrimination since 1964.207
Edwin F. Chociey Jr.
206 The establishment of a unified Internal Market within Europe will not only
benefit the European Community (EC of the Community) member states, but also
foreign manufacturers who do business with EC nations due to the removal of legislative hindrances to intra-European trade. Comment, The Single European Act: A
Profitable Perspective Not Only for the European Community, 20 Sw. U.L. REV. 175, 184,
187 (1991). The Single European Act's (the Act) dismantling of economic, physical
and technical barriers to free trade and movement will provide American firms with
excellent opportunities for investment and exporting. Jones, Putting "1992" in Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 463, 476 (1989). Concomitantly, the Act will increase the competitiveness of EC firms both worldwide and within the Community
thereby creating risks for United States corporations seeking to reach into and beyond the Internal Market of 1992. Id. The major innovation of the Internal Market
is the establishment of a largely uniform program of testing standards and trade
regulations. Bangemann, Fortress Europe: The Myth, 9 Nw. J. INr'L. L. & Bus. 480,
481 (1989). Such a program will facilitate the free movement of EC-manufactured
goods as well as foreign products injected into the markets of EC nations. Van
Voorst tot Voorst, Europe 1992: Free Movement of Goods in the Wider Context of a Changing Europe, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 693, 704 (1988). Consequently, the Internal
Market will eliminate regulatory distinctions between EC goods and foreign goods.
Id. Further, the community banking policy of product and geographical deregulation will thrust EC financial centers into the center of international business. Zavvos, Banking Integration and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 31 HARV. INT'L.
L.J. 463, 464 (1990). Thus, the EC's support for the liberalization of world trade
through the Single European Act, will greatly benefit foreign corporations by allowing them to manufacture a product in conformity with only one set of community-wide specifications. Moens, The 1992 Challenge: The Right of Establishment and the
Freedom of Movement of Goods in the European Community, 16 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 70,
74, 76 (1990). Indeed, such trade benefits for non-EC nations belie the Act's alleged creation of an independent super-state. Campbell, The Single EuropeanAct and
the Implications, 35 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 932, 938 (1986). There is some concern,
however, that the Act will render Western Europe impermeable to foreign trade
and investment. Jarvis, American Business and the Single European Act: Sealing the Walls
of "Fortress Europe", 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 227, 251 (1990). To rally support among
EC countries for the implementation of the Act, the planners of the Internal Market
pledged that foreign firms would be constrained from entering the Market until
every Community member realizes the advantages of the Act. Id. Thus, the Act
will unavoidably create the so-called Fortress Europe. Id.
207 The application of Title VII to United States corporations operating in foreign countries would be consistent with the international consensus on eliminating
discrimination in employment. Note, Equal Employment Opportunity for Americans
Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1288, 1299-1300, 1301 (1987). Consequently, foreign
opposition to an extraterritorial construction of the statute should be unpersuasive.
Id. The protection of American workers form civil rights violations by United
States employers would effectuate the worldwide interest in equal employment op-
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portunity. Comment, supra note 205, at 384-85. Despite the emerging interdependency of national economies, American courts refuse to disavow their territorialist
approach to labor disputes, which is a perspective better suited to the beginning
half of the century. Turley, supra note 6, at 663-64.

